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India is one of the largest IPO markets in the world. However, IPO research in the 
developing world is limited. The primary objective of this study is to test the 
performance of Indian IPOs based on sponsored versus non-sponsored issues. We 
classify the IPO sample into venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) sponsored 




The dependent variable is the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The study 
uses key operating characteristics such as market capitalization, net sales, EBITDA, 
depreciation and amortization, price-to-book, asset turnover and leverage. A cross 
sectional analysis is applied to test the long run performance. 
 
Findings (mandatory) 
Sponsored IPO issues convey favourable information to investors about future 
earnings and prospects of the firm. Our findings indicate that sponsored issues and, 
in particular PE sponsored issues are perceived by investors as  having a positive 
impact on the operational performance of firms that the PE firms are involved in 
relative to the constituents of the index and this superior operational performance 
over time also leads to relatively better performing share prices. There are 
significant differences in terms of market size, industry classification and key 
operating characteristics across the three groups of issues.  
Research limitations/implications 
This study has had to deal with much smaller samples of PE and VC when 
compared to similar studies conducted in the developed markets such as UK and 
US. Further robustness tests on the market performance using factor models posed 
a problem due to limitation of the availability of these factors. 
 
Practical implications 
For the capital markets investors and policy makers, this research demonstrates the 
increasingly important role that private equity and venture capital funds play in the 
investment landscape in India. It exhibits the increasing investor confidence in the 
Indian capital markets. 
 
Originality/value (mandatory) 
Using a sample of Indian IPOs comprising VC-sponsored and PE-sponsored issues, 
this study analyses the performance of Indian IPOs in an emerging market setting. 
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India is one of the leading and popular emerging market destinations for 
investments. In 2018, India was ranked first in terms of IPO volume (EY Global Trends 
Report,2018). However, IPO research in the developing world is limited. The primary 
objective of this study is to test the performance of Indian IPOs based on sponsored versus 
non-sponsored issues. This study examines if venture capital and private equity sponsored 
IPOs perform better than non-sponsored IPOs in India, and, therefore, whether sponsored 
issues are perceived by investors as an indicator of future superior performance and a high-
quality investment for the Indian IPO market. Previous literature (Nahata, 2008; Harris, 
Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014) show that private equity (PE, henceforth) and venture capital 
(VC, henceforth) firms have a reputation to preserve and require superior transparency 
standards and practices. Thus, we hypothesize that sponsored issues are well prepared to 
go public and perform well after the issue. This is not necessarily the case for non-
sponsored issues. This study seeks to extend our understanding of Indian IPOs from a 
different perspective by classifying the IPO issues as per their sponsorships i.e. VC and PE 
sponsored issues and examining their performance respectively. We also investigate which 
of the sponsored issues i.e. VC or PE sponsored perform better.  
This study is a relevant issue in an emerging market such as India. Since the 
liberalization reforms of 1992, the Indian capital market has evolved tremendously (Saith, 
2008, Sayed, 2017; Dayanandan and Sra, 2018; Tiwari and Vidyarthi,2018). Indian 
investors, regulators and government introduced and adopted various measures to improve 
the institutional settings1 in the country (Wadhwa and Reddy, 2018; Saith, 2008). Indian 
capital markets are regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), The 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the central bank of India, Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI). Institutional investors2 play an important role in developing markets 
globally and India is no exception. The number of stock exchanges3, new issues4, trading 
 
1 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India was established under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
Code. 
2 Institutional monies in India are regulated by Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), 
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), SEBI and RBI. 
3 The National Stock Exchange (NSE) launched the first electronic screen-based trading in 1994, 
derivatives trading (in the form of index futures) and internet trading in 2000. 
4 For an overall view on the Indian IPO market and institutional characteristics since liberalization reforms 




volumes, sponsors are few of the changes that can be observed in the Indian capital 
markets.  With liberalization, the Indian corporate sector began to raise capital from the 
primary markets to meet their various objectives. Didier and Schmukler (2013) find that 
the Indian financial system has developed rapidly and evolved deeply. For example, they 
find that the stock market capitalization increased from 22 percent in India in 1992 to 95 
percent of GDP in 2015. A robust institutional environment and favourable economic 
indicators allowed India to benefit from international liquidity since 1991, and its stock 
market boomed. 
Due to the phenomenal growth of India after the liberalization reforms in 1992, 
venture capital and private equity have emerged as key players in the Indian investment 
landscape. Private equity is a significant contributor to India’s economic growth. Between 
2003 and 2017, their investment was more than $97 billion in the Indian economy 
(Mckinsey Report, 2018). In 2017, the total PE deal value was the highest ever in India- 
about $26.4 billion vs. $16.8 billion in 2016. The investment value increased by 57% (Bain 
Consulting Report, 2018). Private equity inflows have remained strong, even as India’s 
GDP growth rates plunged from a peak of 9.6 per cent in 2007 to 4.7 per cent in 2014 amid 
high market volatility (Mckinsey Report ,2018). Venture capital plays a vital role in the 
development and growth of innovative entrepreneurships and high growth start-ups. In the 
past (prior to 1991), VC activity was carried out by the developmental financial institutions 
such as State Financial Corporations (SFC). Currently, the venture capital and private 
equity firms are primarily private entities. In 2018, VC deals crossed 697 deals and worth 
more than $6.55 billion (Bain Consulting, 2018). The Indian Government recognises the 
role that VC and PE play in the Indian economy. They have introduced reforms such as 
exempting these entities from IPO lock-ups; clarity of tax classification for Authorized 
Investment Funds (AIF), minimizing discretion; allowing these entities with foreign capital 
to be classified as domestic capital (completely removing FDI and pricing regulations), 
provided the fund manager is domestic owned and controlled (Preqin 2019). 
Despite the positive impact that PE and VC have on the Indian economy, one of the 
main challenges that they face is their narrow exit options. Espenlaub, Khurshed and 






and PE firms for investments made abroad. In India, IPOs remain a regular exit route to 
both PE and VC firms (McKinsey Report,2018), an avenue that was non-existent before 
1991. The PE model highlights strict monitoring, experience of the top management and 
high levels of debt which in turn leads to improved operational efficiencies in the post IPO 
performance (Johan and Zhang,2016). PE sponsors take responsibility for the terms, 
structure and time of the issue, offering a wider perspective (Weisman, 1996). Zhang and 
Pezeshkan (2015) argue how industry experience and social networks are key to the success 
of the private equity industry. Any investments by VC firms are expected to create and add 
value through their strict and continuous monitoring and continued involvement and 
association with the firms (Raghupathy and Thillairajan, 2015). The key difference 
between the two investment vehicles is that VC firms tend to normally invest in new start-
ups and use mainly equity. On the other hand, PE firms tend to buy mature firms across all 
sectors and use a combination of debt and equity. In 2017, Indian stock exchanges ranked 
second globally in terms of the number of IPOs (EY Global Trend Report, 2017).  Given 
that IPO remains an important exit route for VC and PE, the purpose of this study is to 
examine the performance of Indian IPOs based on issues sponsored by PE and VC to that 
of non-sponsored issues.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, it 
contributes to the limited IPO research undertaken in the developing world by 
providing econometric analyses of the performance of Indian IPOs based on sponsored 
versus unsponsored issues. To the best of our knowledge, Raghupathy et al., (2015) 
and Gohil and Vyas (2015) are the only ones who provide an analysis of VC and PE 
sponsored issues respectively. However, Raghupathy et al., (2015) examine only VC 
sponsored issues and conclude that VC sponsored issues outperform unsponsored issues. 
Their study does not consider PE backed issues. Similarly, Gohil et al., (2015) investigate 
PE sponsored issues and find that PE sponsored issues outperform non-sponsored issues, 
but they do not consider VC backed issues. We argue that since the primary aim of this 
study is to analyse the performance of all sponsored Indian IPO issues, it is imperative to 
include both VC and PE sponsored issues in the same sample. This study undertakes a 
comprehensive and combined analysis of both PE and VC sponsored issues over non-
sponsored issues, thus offering a detailed analysis of performance of IPOs from a 




issues in India do not consider characteristics of the firms prior to listing. Levis (2011), 
Smolarski, Wilner and Yang (2011) and Groh, Liechtenstein and Lieser(2010) argue that 
IPO performance may be predictable based on various characteristics of the firms. This 
study offers evidence on key differences in the operating characteristics of the firms prior 
to listing when we classify our IPO sample into three sets, namely PE sponsored, VC 
sponsored and other non-sponsored (NS) IPOs. Finally, the findings of this paper also 
present another perspective on the underperformance of IPOs by examining the 
classification of the overall IPO sample in terms of VC and PE sponsored and non-
sponsored issuances from a developing economy outlook.   
Our results show that while abnormal buy-and-hold returns of PE-sponsored IPOs 
remain positive and significant during the entire period under consideration, the 
performance of the VC sponsored is consistently poorer or negative. Next, the paper tests 
the relationship patterns between the performance of the firms and the various features of 
firms’ operational characteristics after the listing. The findings of the regression analysis 
indicate that significant distinctions exist in respect of returns, market capitalization and 
firm characteristics amongst the three sets of IPOs.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of IPO literature 
Section 3 describes the data and methods used in this study. Section 4 focuses on the 
distribution across the three sets of IPOs. Section 5 outlines the empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 6 presents the conclusions of the paper.  
2. Related Literature 
     Extensive research tests the short run and long run performance of IPOs (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Jenkinson and Jones, 2009; Ang and Boyer, 2009; Lewellyn and Bao, 
2014).  Previous research in the USA markets (Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 2000), UK 
(Levis, 1993; Goergen, Khurshed, A and Mudambi, 2007) and other international markets 
(Lee, Taylor and Walter, 1996; Kooli and Suret ,2004; Killins and Egly, 2018) find similar 
findings of IPO under-performance. Evidence of underperformance is prevalent in the 
emerging economies as well (Kiymaz, 2000; Hensler, Herrera and Lockwood, 2000; Smith 
and Chun, 2003; Naifar,2011; Otchere and Vong, 2016). Most of these studies suggest 
positive returns in the short run and significant underperformance in the aftermarket. One 




characteristics of the issues, information asymmetries or their sponsors (Johan and Zhang, 
2016; Levis, 2011; Kirkulak, 2008; Phylaktis, 2009).  
Studies show that PE sponsored IPOs report higher earnings and better management 
reflecting on the performance at the stock market demonstrating positive abnormal long 
run returns (Katz, 2009). Katz (2009) and Levis (2011) report that PE investors have the 
benefit of a greater involvement in the issuing firm’s management compared to venture 
capital firms and an increased level of financial expertise that non-sponsored firm owners 
do not have. Firms with greater PE sponsor ownership have better long run stock price 
returns and firms that are run by larger PE sponsors have better performance in the long 
term when they go afloat in the stock market. Bergstrom, Nilsson and. Wahlberg (2006) 
find that PE sponsored IPOs outperform in France and UK but both samples show negative 
abnormal performance for five years from going public. Minardi, Ferrari and 
AraújoTavares (2013) find that PE sponsored IPOs in the Brazilian stock market have a 
superior performance relative to non-PE sponsored IPOs.  Brav and Gompers (1997) argue 
that VC sponsored IPOs usually have better management structures and corporate 
governance leading to better long run performance comparing them to non-sponsored 
IPOs. Campbell and Frye (2009) argue that VC sponsored issues perform better because of 
reduced asymmetry of information and large shareholdings thus improving the long run 
returns. Suchard (2009) find that low or no VC involvement leads to underperformance in 
the stock market. Similarly, Givoly and Shi (2008) find that issues with VC backing tend 
to have lower IPO under-pricing. Otchere and Vong (2016) find that in China, VC-
sponsored IPOs perform significantly better. Based on these previous studies, we argue 
that in order to examine the short-term and long-term performance of sponsored IPOs, it 
would be imperative and necessary to make a distinction of the sponsors in the IPO issues 
(Levis, 2011; Kirkulak, 2008; Phylaktis, 2009). 
 
2.1   IPOs, Venture Capital and Private Equity in the Indian context 
IPO under-pricing is a phenomenon which is also researched widely in India 
(Krishnamurti and Kumar, 2002; Ghosh, 2005; Subrahmanyam and Marisetty ,2010; 
Bansal and Khanna, 2013; Shette, Kuntluru and Korivi, 2016). Bhatia and Singh (2012) 
analyse 648 IPOs firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (thereafter, BSE) and find 




in the Indian stock exchange after the deregulation of the market. The results show that the 
expectations of the removal of restrictions is affected by lower returns to investors and in 
turn lower cost of capital to the issuing firms (Rock, 1986).  Dhamija and Arora (2014) 
analyse the importance of the newly introduced IPO grading as an additional tool for retail 
investors to make investment decisions. They find that highly graded IPOs did not perform 
better in the national stock market. On the other hand, they report that superior grading 
reduces under-pricing and attracted more responses from investors (Sahoo, 2014). India is 
the only country that releases information on the IPO book-building5 process live to 
investors (Khurshed, Paleari, Pande, A and Vismara, 2014 and Clarke, Khurshed, Pande 
and Singh, 2016). Neupane, Paudyal and Thapa (2014) find that institutional investors in 
the Indian IPO market focus more on firm quality when deciding to invest in new shares. 
Khurshed et.al (2014) examine the performance of IPOs with book building in the Indian 
market. They find that IPOs with low and high premiums were insignificant in under-
pricing, but IPOs issued with low premiums are usually under-priced despite having 
consistent returns after the issue. These findings support the results of Krishnamurti and 
Kumar (2002). Sahoo (2015) examines the relation between subscription rate and 
aftermarket volatility for IPOs and find that subscription rate is a good indicator of 
aftermarket volatility for the IPO stocks.  
However, none of these studies makes a distinction on the type of investors, i.e. VC 
and PE sponsored IPOs in their analysis. We argue that it is important to make a distinction 
on the type of investor involvement when investigating the performance of IPOs as their 
involvement may have an impact on the performance. Raghupathy et al., (2015) find 
superior performance of VC sponsored IPOs. However, their sample does not distinguish 
PE sponsored issues. Similarly, Gohil et al., (2015) find that PE backed issues outperform 
non-sponsored issues. However, once again, they do not consider VC sponsored issues in 
their analysis. Since PE and VC are key players in the Indian capital markets and IPOs is 
a popular exit option, it is necessary to distinguish between the two sponsored issues when 
analysing their performance. 
 




To our knowledge, no studies till date have examined a comparative and combined 
analysis of the performance of VC, PE sponsored issues versus non- sponsored IPOs in the 
Indian setting.  
3. Materials and Methods 
3.1 Data 
The source of our data is Bloomberg6. This study uses data on the IPO issues listed 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange 500 (thereafter, BSE 500) for the period 20067 to 2018. 
For the purpose of this study, sponsored IPO issues of VC8 and PE are identified as per the 
definition in Bloomberg. The sample consists of 382 IPOs listed on the BSE 500 
comprising of 268 non-sponsored (thereafter, NS), 50 VC sponsored, and 64 PE sponsored. 
The financial liberalization drive allowed for the existence of alternative investments in 
India only from 2006 onwards (Ghosh, 2005). The BSE 500 Index was chosen as an 
appropriate index as it represents 93% of the market capitalization on the Bombay stock 
market posing a more accurate measure (Lalwani and Chakraborthy,2018). 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the buy and hold abnormal returns9 (BHARs, 
thereafter). For each issue, BHARs are estimated by compounding 36 month returns after 












Where, rit and rbt are the raw returns on IPO i and the selected benchmark b at month t. 
3.3 Operating Characteristics 
       Following Minardi et al., (2013), this study includes firm operating characteristics such 
as market capitalization, net sales, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
 
6 Bloomberg is a real time financial data software terminal enabling users to download, view and analyse. 
Data is available for all countries and government and forecasts also given. It allows users to trade equities, 
bonds and other financial asset classes 
7  The first VC sponsored IPO occurred in 2006. 
8 Following Levis (2011), a VC sponsored IPO is identified as a firm that receives start up, developing or 
expansion support before going public. Venture capitalists normally have a minority interest. On the other 
hand, a PE sponsored IPO is a firm where a sponsor holds a controlling interest attained at the time of a 
buyout. VC and PE firms would then choose IPO as an exit route and sell their entire stake. 
 
9 Following Ritter (1991), BHARs is arguably the preferred measure for analysing investment 




amortization, price-to-book, asset turnover and leverage. Market capitalization is 
calculated by multiplying shares outstanding by the current market price of each share. The 
investment community uses this figure to determine a company's size, as opposed to sales 
or total asset figures (Pandey and Sehgal,2016). Net sales are the amount of sales generated 
by a company after the deduction of returns, allowances for damaged or missing goods and 
any discounts allowed. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) is another variable used in the study. It is calculated as revenues less expenses 
(excluding tax, interest, depreciation and amortization). The price-to-book ratio, (P/B ratio) 
is the current market price to its book value. The asset turnover ratio is calculated as the 
ratio of the value of a firm’s sales or revenues generated relative to its assets. Finally, we 
use leverage and is defined as the ratio of short term and long-term debt to total equity. 
3.4 Methods 
We adopt a cross sectional analysis to test the performance of the three sets of IPOs. 
The null hypothesis is that the mean buy-and- hold abnormal returns are equal to zero. 
Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), we use the skewness adjusted t-statistics to test 
the null hypothesis. We report BHARs for two benchmarks: 1) the BSE Share Index, and 
(2) an industry benchmark. 
To gain a better understanding of the long-term performance of IPOs, we undertake 
a multivariate regression for the overall sample and the three sets of IPOs separately. This 
would then consider the characteristics or nature related to the positive returns. The 
regression takes the following form: 
𝑅𝑤 = 𝛼 + 𝛽11𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝐸(𝑉𝐶) 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where, Rw is the dependent variable of the equally weighted 36-month relative wealth 
(natural logarithm); Following Cao and Lerner(2009) and Levis (2011), we classify the 
control variables into two groups, namely, the first group that represents IPO characteristics 
at the time of the listing (i.e., the first-day return which is the logarithm of first day returns, 
Marketcap which is the logarithm of market value of firms at the time of listing , PTBV 
which is the price to book at the offer price). The second group includes operating 




to total assets) at the first year after the IPO. PE(VC) Dummy is used to represent the PE 
and VC sponsorship during the sample period.  
4. Distribution of IPOs  
Table 1 represents the distribution of the number of IPOs from 2006 to 2018 across 
the three sets. The total amount raised is the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
issued. The market capitalization is the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding after the IPO. We observe that a total amount of Rs.159 Crores ($20.83 million 
USD) were raised by IPO issues. Venture capital sponsored IPOs account for 13% in terms 
of the volume but only 10% of the total amount raised. On the other hand, private equity 
sponsored issues account for 17% of the volume but amounts for roughly 15% of the total 
amount raised.  
In terms of market capitalization, we find that the private equity sponsored IPOs 
are on average larger firms with a market capitalization with Rs.28,054 Crores ($365 
million USD) than their VC sponsored counterparts with Rs.7,969.5 Crores ($103 million 
USD). A closer analysis shows that more than 60% of the NS IPOs went public with a 
market capitalization below Rs.10 Crores ($15.1 million USD), comparing to the PE 
sponsored IPOs where almost all of them had larger market capitalizations. Comparatively, 
VC sponsored IPOs have a smaller market capitalization out of the three sets of IPOs. 
 
Table 1 here. 
 
Table 2 represents the classification of IPOs sector wise, number of issuances and 
the total amount raised in each sector. Our findings highlight some important distinctions 
across the three sets of IPOs. For example, around 70% of the amount raised for private 
equity sponsored IPOs relate to consumer goods and services whereas 85% of the VC 
sponsored IPOs are involved in the same industry. Consumer services also accounts for 
22% of the NS IPOs making this industry a popular one in India for companies to be listed 
on the exchange. These distinctions in industrial composition across the three IPO sets may 
have an impact on the performance of these issuances. 
 





Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the three sets of IPOs based on firm size 
and operating characteristics. It reports the median values for market capitalization, the 
number of employees, total assets, sales, EBITDA, operating margin, asset turnover and 
leverage for each of the three IPO sets. The accounting values are obtained at the end of 
the financial year of the firm prior to IPO. In terms of market capitalization, we find that 
private equity sponsored IPOs are larger relative to sponsored issues by venture capitalists. 
They also appear to perform better in net sales and operating margins are higher than that 
of VC sponsored IPOs. It should also be noted that despite the smaller number of 
observations for PE, the median for total assets, net sales and EBITDA is substantially 
higher relative to NS IPOs.  
The VC sponsored IPOs tend to have more assets and higher earnings. This is also 
reflected in the asset turnover ratio. When we examine the ratio of size (market 
capitalization to earnings), we find VC sponsored IPOs are the highest at 24.3. 
Interestingly, VC sponsored IPOs tend to have the highest leverage. Levis (2011) argue 
that these differences are not astonishing given that private equity investors and venture 
capitalists use various selection measures whilst making their investments.  
 
Table 3 here. 
  To summarize our findings here, we can conclude that most of the VC and PE 
sponsored IPOs were floated in the recent years as opposed to the NS IPOs, highlighting 
the financial liberalisation on alternative investments, after the year 2005, where barriers 
to alternative investment options were lifted (Table 1). Table 2 shows that sponsored IPOs 
are popular within the consumer goods and consumer services sector accounting for more 
than half of the PE and VC sponsored IPOs. 
In Table 3, we can conclude that based on the operational characteristics of the 
sample, the medians of the PE sponsored IPOs and VC sponsored IPOs are quite close to 
each other. We find that PE sponsored IPOs are bigger. They report higher net sales than 
both the VC sponsored IPOs and NS IPOs. Despite the lower number of observations, the 
median for total assets for PE sponsored IPOs is higher than that of the NS IPOs. These 




findings. Our results show that fundamental differences in firm characteristics exist in the 
sample of sponsored and non-sponsored IPO issues. This finding confirms that there are 
marked differences across firm characteristics in the sample of NS, VC and PE sponsored 
IPO issues.  
Our evidence demonstrates that PE sponsored IPOs are on average, larger in terms 
of amount raised, market capitalization, sales and assets, and tend to concentrate in certain 
industries related to consumer services and consumer goods 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports the cross-sectional analysis of the short run and long-run 
performance of the entire sample of IPOs. For each IPO, the daily BHARs are estimated 
by compounding daily returns up to the end of the month, twelve months and thirty-six 
months. If a firm delists, then returns are compounded until the date of delisting. The results 
are reported for one month, one year and three-year for the whole sample of IPOs and each 
of the three sets using two alternative benchmarks: (a) BSE benchmark and (b) the industry 
sector described in section 3.4. 
Table 4 here. 
Panel A in Table 4 presents the equally weighted and value weighted BHAR results 
of the entire sample of IPOs for the BSE and industry benchmarks. We find that the one 
month, twelve months and thirty-six-month BHARs for the entire sample is negative and 
significant which is consistent with the previous findings of long-term underperformance.  
Panel B reports the equal weighted and value weighted buy and hold abnormal 
returns for the non-sponsored issues. The NS group has a much worse short run and long-
run performance than the other two sets of VC and PE sponsored. Here, we can conclude 
that the negative results for the full sample (Panel A) are principally attributable to the 
weaker performance of NS IPOs. The finding supports the argument that the prevalence of 
underperformance in the NS IPOs is more pronounced than that in the sample of PE and 
VC sponsored IPOs. 
Panel C reports the equally weighted and value weighted BHARs for the VC 
sponsored IPOs. Between the equally weighted and value weighted measures, we find that 




against the marked index benchmark (BSE) at -1.25 percent is better than the industry 
benchmark of -3.26 percent. But, the long-run underperformance is still prevalent. 
Panel D presents the performance of the PE sponsored IPOs. Here, we find that the 
PE sponsored IPOs outperform both benchmarks in the one year and three-year interval 
period. For example, the significant and positive returns in the industry benchmark is 4.28 
percent as opposed to 3.32 percent with the BSE benchmark. It should also be noted here 
that the PE sponsored IPOs have outperformed the NS and VC sponsored IPOs. 
The results above show striking differences in the long-term performance across 
the three groups of IPOs. The findings demonstrate that PE sponsored IPOs outperform the 
two benchmarks. PE sponsored IPOs attain positive and significant buy and hold abnormal 
returns, both in equal and value-weighted terms, in the thirty-six-month period. However, 
VC sponsored IPOs and NS issues appear as poor performers. The evidence supports the 
widespread market perception that since PE involvement facilitates closer monitoring and 
reduces information asymmetries, it leads to relatively enhanced operating performance of 
the firms. This, in turn, leads to better share price performance in the long run. These results 
imply that investors would benefit in the form of earning abnormal returns if they were to 
invest in PE sponsored issues. This finding is consistent with Katz (2009).  
From the discussion above, we can conclude that the results indicate marked 
differences in the short-term and long-term returns amongst the three sets of IPOs with the 
PE sponsored issues outperforming the benchmark. Cao and Lerner (2009) and Levis 
(2011) document that the differences in the IPO performances may be due to the various 
inherent features of the firms. Cao and Lerner (2009) argue that in order to minimize any 
biases from composition effects of the sample, it is essential to undertake performance 
robustness checks by restricting the sample to revenues(sales), size(assets) and leverage. 
Thus, following Cao and Lerner (2009) and Levis (2011), Table 5 presents a few 
performance robustness checks where we constrain each of the sets with total assets of 
Rs.40 Crore ($60.5 million USD) or more, total sales Rs.10 Crore ($15.1 million USD) or 
more, and a leverage ratio of 10% or more. The BHARs are reported relative to the BSE 
Index. BHARs are calculated for thirty-six months after the listing. All accounting 
variables are as of the financial year of the issue.  
 





Panel A examines the performance distinctions for the three sets by constraining 
the size of assets to more than Rs.40 Crore ($60.5 million USD). The top 43.2% of the PE 
sponsored IPOs continue to perform well in terms of assets. 
Panel B tests the returns differences for the three sets by restricting the sales to more 
than Rs.10 Crore ($15.1 million USD). The results are distinct as PE sponsored IPOs 
clearly outperform its counterparts. 
Panel C refers to the restriction placed on firm leverage of higher than 10%. Here, 
we observe that the marked differences amongst the three sets become more distinct. 78.2% 
of the PE sponsored IPOs above this leverage level perform better than the VC sponsored 
and NS issues with similar levels of leverage. 
The evidence suggests that the positive performance of PE sponsored IPOs is 
consistent across the various dimensions of operational characteristics. We find that the 
performance of PE sponsored IPOs appear to be the best in terms of debt utilisation. This 
finding supports the argument that leverage is the core of the PE business model and that 
the performance of the firm increases with higher levels of leverage (Jensen,1989).This is 
also consistent with the findings of  Johan and Zhang (2016) who identify high levels of 
debt as one of the factors that leads to improved operational efficiencies of PE sponsored 
firms. 
5.1 Performance Differences across sponsored and non-sponsored IPOs 
The characteristics of the firms or investors’ future expectations are the possible 
reasons for the positive performance of PE sponsored IPOs (Levis, 2011). Table 6 reports 
regression results for the performance of the overall sample of IPOs and then for each of 
the three sets of IPOs for the thirty-six-month period. The natural logarithm of wealth 
relative to the BSE 500 as the benchmark is the dependent variable. This is calculated as 
the buy-and-hold cumulative return for each of the groups of IPOs divided by the 
equivalent buy-and-hold return of the BSE 500 Index. The explanatory variables are the 
market capitalization, first day returns, price to book ratio, asset turnover, leverage, PE and 
VC dummy variables.  For the full sample of IPOs, the coefficient estimate for the intercept 
is negative and significant. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate for the PE dummy 
is positive and significant. This confirms the positive performance for PE sponsored IPOs.   




Furthermore, the first day returns are negative for the whole sample and NS group but 
positive for the VC and PE sponsored sets. We find that the coefficient estimate for market 
capitalization is positive for the PE sponsored issues. This is consistent with the results in 
Table 4. 
The evidence relating to operational indicators are also of interest as each of the set 
of IPOs emerges with a different pattern. The coefficients for market capitalization and 
leverage are positive for the entire group. Notably, PE sponsored IPOs have a higher 
leverage value compared to its counterparts. This is also consistent with evidence from the 
study on leveraged buy outs (Acharya et. al, 2013). PE sponsored IPOs have performed 
significantly better than its non-sponsored counterparts. They further show better returns 
in the long run up to 36 months and increased profitability and leverage consistent with 
Levis (2011)’s findings in the UK.  
Overall, the regression results show that the performance of PE sponsored IPOs is 
significantly better than that of the NS and VC sponsored IPO issues.  Our findings clearly 
demonstrate that there is a positive and significant relation between leverage and long-run 
performance for the PE sponsored issues. This conclusion is consistent with Jensen 
(1989)’s concept of value creation by PE. It also lends credence to the argument that the 
high utilization of debt is possibly one of the key drivers for the PE model. This evidence 
also further establishes that an investor would earn positive returns by investing in PE 
sponsored issues. 
 
Table 6 here. 
6. Conclusion 
Since the liberalisation reforms of 1992, the landscape of the Indian financial 
system has undergone significant and positive changes. Indian VCs and PEs which are 
private entities have entered the foray as key players in the field of financing. IPOs remain 
a popular exit route for these entities. The primary aim of this paper is to examine the 
performance of IPOs from a sponsorship perspective i.e. PE and VC sponsored IPOs and 
ascertain which sponsored issue fare better. We find that the performance of PE sponsored 
IPO is significantly better than that of the NS and VC sponsored IPO performance. 
 Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, it fills 




sponsored versus unsponsored issues. To the best of our knowledge, Raghupathy et al., 
(2015) and Gohil et al., (2015) are the only ones who provide an analysis of VC and PE 
sponsored issues respectively. However, Raghupathy et al., (2015) examine only VC 
sponsored issues and similarly, Gohil et al., (2015) investigate only PE sponsored issues in 
their study. This study fills the gap by distinguishing between PE and VC sponsored issues 
in the sample to gain a better understanding of the performance of sponsored IPOs. 
Secondly, previous studies that examine sponsored issues in India do not consider 
characteristics of the firms prior to listing. This study offers evidence on key differences 
in the operating characteristics of the firms prior to listing. Finally, the findings of this 
paper also present another perspective on the underperformance of IPOs by examining the 
classification of the overall IPO sample in terms of PE and VC sponsored and non-
sponsored issuances from a developing economy outlook.   
Sponsored IPO issues convey favourable information to investors about future 
earnings and prospects of the firm. We contend that our findings indicate that sponsored 
issues and, in particular the PE sponsored issues are perceived by investors positively. 
Investors view PE participation in firms to have a positive impact on the operational 
performance of firms relative to the constituents of the index. This superior operational 
performance over time also leads to relatively better performing share prices and lead 
investors to earn abnormal returns by investing in PE sponsored IPOs. We argue that any 
PE involvement in an IPO convey favourable information to investors about future 
earnings and prospects of the firm’s better management relative to VC or non-sponsored 
issues. We also argue that the favourable institutional framework has encouraged PE and 
VC investments to gain momentum in India hence making it a viable alternative investment 
destination.  
The main challenge in this research was the limitation posed by the availability of 
data from an emerging economy such as India. As observed, given that India is an emerging 
economy, this study has had to deal with much smaller samples of PE and VC when 
compared to similar studies conducted in the developed markets such as UK and US. 
Further robustness tests on the market performance using factor models posed a problem 
due to limitation of the availability of the factors.  Unlike the extensive studies conducted 
in the UK and USA and other developed markets, limited availability of data at firm level 




to the factors that underline the performance variances between venture capital and private 
equity-sponsored IPOs remains open. A detailed analysis of their management and 
operational strategies may prove useful. Future scope of research may include analysis of 
the performance of PE and VC sponsored IPOs by examining the reputation of the 
underwriter and sponsors, book building activity and its impact on the performance of 
sponsored IPOs. Nevertheless, the findings of this study with its limited samples and other 
limitations do have an implication and contribution to the existing literature on IPOs from 
an emerging market perspective. 
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